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Much work has been devoted to studying percolation of networks and interdependent networks under varying
levels of failures. Researchers have considered many different realistic network structures, but thus far no study
has incorporated the hierarchical structure of many networks. For example, infrastructure across cities will likely
be distributed such that nodes are tightly connected within small neighborhoods, somewhat less connected across
the whole city, and have even fewer connections between cities. Furthermore, while previous work identified
interconnected nodes, those nodes with links outside their neighborhood, to be more likely to be attacked, here
we have various levels of interconnections (between neighborhoods, between cities, etc.). We consider the nodes
with interconnections at the highest level most likely to be attacked, followed by those with interconnections at
the next level, etc. We develop an analytic solution for both single and interdependent networks of this structure
and verify our theory through simulations. We find that depending on the number of levels in the hierarchy there
may be multiple transitions in the giant component (fraction of interconnected nodes), as the network separates
at the various levels. Our results show that these multiple jumps are a feature of hierarchical networks and can
affect the vulnerability of infrastructure networks.
INTRODUCTION
The robustness of infrastructure systems can be under-
stood through the frameworks of complex networks, per-
colation, and interdependent networks [1–10]. The initial
research on network robustness was later expanded to in-
clude various network structures such as various degree
distributions [11–13], clustering [14, 15], spatial em-
bedding [16–18], and quite recently, community struc-
ture [19, 20]. Further, additional research has consid-
ered various types of attacks on these networks such as
degree-based attacks [21, 22], localized attacks [23, 24],
and attacks based on nodes linking across communities
[19, 20, 25].
However, other common network structures that are
likely relevant for robustness have not yet been studied.
Among these is a hierarchical structure, which we will
study here, where communities connect loosely with one
another to form larger communities and so on [26–28]
(See Fig. 1). In the context of infrastructure robustness
these overlapping modules are likely described through
neighborhoods overlapping to form cities, which then
overlap to form states, etc. which are then interconnected
among themselves.
Furthermore, in this model, the nodes at the highest
level of the hierarchy (e.g. between states) are likely
more vulnerable to failure or attack than those at the
next highest level, which are in turn more vulnerable
than those at an even lower level etc. This is because
the nodes at higher levels have longer distance links be-
tween them which are more likely to fail or be attacked
[29] and also have higher betweenness [19] which yields
additional load on them [30, 31]. Also, recent work by da
FIG. 1. Model Illustration. For this realization, the model
has 4 hierarchical layers. At the top layer there are 3 modules,
each of which is broken down into 4 modules, each of which is
then broken down into 3 modules, which are not broken down
further. We could describe this configuration of modules by the
vector ~m = [1, 3, 12, 36]
Cunha et al. [25] showed that attacks on these ‘intercon-
nected nodes’ are an optimal form of attack on the US
power grid, an infrastructure system of critical interest.
MODEL
Our model is a stochastic block model [32–35] with
overlap among the various blocks.
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We first define the vector ~m describing the number of
distinct modules or communities (blocks) at each layer.
At the first layer we always consider the entire network
as a single community, thus m1 = 1. The next layer, m2
counts how many modules are at the top layer. Next is
the total number of modules at the third layer, next is
the modules at the fourth layer, etc (we also assume for
simplicity that all of the m j modules are broken down
into the same fixed number of m j+1 modules). For exam-
ple, if we take the network shown in Fig. 1, we would
say ~m = [1, 3, 12, 36], since the top layer is a connected
graph, at the next layer we have three modules, then a
total of 12 modules (i.e. each of the three is broken down
into four smaller modules and 3×4 = 12), and finally 36,
since each of the 12 modules is broken down into three
additional ones.
We next define the vector ~k, which describes the aver-
age degree between nodes connected at each layer of the
network. Thus, if at the highest layer there is an average
of 0.1 links between each module, this will be the first
entry, k1 in ~k. If the average degree at the next layer is
0.3 then that will be the second entry, k2 etc. We assume
that the entries of ~k should be strictly increasing since
we expect there to be more links within communities at
a lower layer than at a higher layer (e.g. neighborhoods
are more tightly connected than cities).
We will carry out a targeted attack on the nodes of the
network, assuming that nodes that are interconnected at
the top level are most likely to fail. To do so, we must
determine how many nodes are connected at each level
and convert from their survival likelihood to the overall
survival likelihood. We can estimate how many nodes are
connected at level i as 1 − e−ki [19]. We then define ri as
the survival probability of interconnected nodes at layer
i. For the top layer of interconnections we can convert
from r1, the survival probability of interconnected nodes
at the highest level, to p, the overall survival probability,
using [19]
r1 =
p − e−k1
1 − e−k1 . (1)
After we have removed all nodes with interconnec-
tions at the top level, we then begin removing those
nodes with interconnections at the next level. In order
to convert from the survival probability of nodes at this
next level, r2 and the new overall survival probability p,
we must take into account those nodes removed at the
previous layer.
We do so by first finding the value of p for which we
have removed all nodes at a given layer. For example,
for the first layer the cutoff for which all nodes with in-
terconnections at this layer are removed is pco1 = e
−k1 .
For the next layer the cutoff is given by recognizing that
the number of nodes with interconnections at this next
layer is e−k2 , but we are already at a survival probability
of only pco1 and also some of these nodes also had inter-
connections at the previous layer. Thus taking these into
account gives that the cutoff of p at the second layer, pco2
is given by the inclusion-exclusion principle as
pco2 = 1 −
(
1 − e−k2 + 1 − e−k1 − (1 − e−k2 )(1 − e−k1 )
)
= e−k2−k1 . (2)
Thus the cutoff value of p, for a given level i is given by
pcoi = e
−∑ij=1 k j . (3)
We can then convert from ri, the survival probability in
level i (after having removed all nodes in higher layers),
to p using
ri =
p − pcoi
pcoi−1 − pcoi
. (4)
ANALYTIC THEORY FOR A SINGLE NETWORK
Having made these conversions, we can now find the
size of the giant component after some fraction of nodes
are removed. For the top level, we can extend previous
results on modular networks by setting our average inter-
connected degree to the degree at the level we are attack-
ing and setting our average intra-degree to the sum of the
degrees at the lower levels [19, 20]. We thus obtain
P∞ = e−k1 (1 − r1)
(
1 − e−(∑li=2 ki)P∞)
+ r1
(
1 − e−(∑li=1 ki)P∞) , p > pco0 . (5)
Once we have removed all interconnected nodes in the
first level, we then move on to removing nodes that are
interconnected at the second level. In this case, the aver-
age degree of interconnections is now k2 and the average
degree of intraconnections is
∑l
i=3 ki, where l is the num-
ber of levels. Furthermore, for this case we will have
removed some fraction 1− r2 of nodes based on targetted
attack of interconnected nodes at this layer, and also pco1
nodes randomly due to the attacks at the above layer. Ad-
ditionally, we must recall that the network at this stage is
already split into m2 separate modules thus we must scale
2
FIG. 2. Comparison of simulation results with theory. In
both figures we have six layers, where each layer splits a mod-
ule into two other modules, thus there are ~m = [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32]
modules at each layer, with the average degrees between nodes
at each layer given by the vector~k in the legend. We have differ-
ent values for the degree at each layer as given in the legends of
(a) and (b). The lines represent the theory outlined above and
the points are simulations averaged over 10 runs on networks
of N = 106 nodes.
P∞ by 1/m2. This gives
m2P∞ = pco1
[
e−k2 (1 − r2)
(
1 − e−(∑li=3 ki)m2P∞)
+ r2
(
1 − e−(∑li=2 ki)m2P∞) ], pco1 > p > pco2 . (6)
In general for all values of p we can find the size of
the largest connected component, P∞ using
m jP∞ = pco j−1
[
e−k j (1 − r j)
(
1 − e−
(∑l
i= j+1 ki
)
m jP∞
)
+ r j
(
1 − e−
(∑l
i= j ki
)
m jP∞
) ]
, pco j−1 > p > pco j . (7)
We compare theory and simulations in Fig. 2, ob-
serving excellent agreement between them. Also, in the
figure we observe multiple discontinuities [36, 37] as
once all interconnected nodes in a particular layer are re-
moved, the system experiences a discontinuous jump.
Number of Abrupt Jumps
We next compute the expected number of jumps that
will take place using our analytic theory from above. We
begin by noting that jumps will occur when all intercon-
nected nodes at a particular layer are removed, yet there
remain enough total surviving nodes such that the hierar-
chy of modules at the next layer remains connected. This
condition can be expressed by recognizing that we need
the value of p of the remaining intralinks to be lower than
the value of p for which all interconnected nodes at this
given level are removed. This condition is given by for a
given level i
e−ki ≥ 1∑l
j=i+1 k j
. (8)
Assuming that the degree at each level of hierarchy is
strictly decreasing, then e−ki is strictly decreasing. Fur-
thermore, assuming all ki > 0 implies that 1/
∑l
j=i+1 k j is
strictly increasing as i increases (since the denominator
must decrease as there are fewer k j terms). Therefore,
once the condition of Eq. (8) is first violated for a partic-
ular level, we know that it will continue to break down
for later levels and thus we can be sure that our number of
jumps is the number of levels for which Eq. (8) is valid.
We plot the two sides of Eq. (8) in Fig. 3a, where for
l ≤ 5 we see that the left-hand-side (LHS) of the equation
is larger than the right-hand-side (RHS). Comparing to
the number of jumps in Fig. 2a we see that the network
indeed experiences 5 abrupt jumps as expected (see inset
for the 5th jump).
The p Values of the Jumps
Having found the number of jumps that the network
will undergo above, we can now analyze the multiple
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values of pc, the critical thresholds at which the jumps
occur. We first note that so long as the LHS of Eq. (8)
is greater than the RHS of the same equation, then there
will be a transition at the point of the LHS of the equa-
tion. After these i transitions, there will be one final i+1st
transition [20] at the point ri+1, which can be found by
solving the below equation for ri+1,
r2i+1
p2coi
 l∑
j=i+2
k j
 ki+1e−ki+1
 + ri+1
pcoiki+1 + pcoi
 l∑
j=i+2
k j
 − pcoi
 l∑
j=i+2
k j
 e−ki+1 − p2coi
 l∑
j=i+2
k j
 ki+1e−ki+1

+
pcoi
 l∑
j=i+2
k j
 e−ki+1 − 1
 = 0. (9)
After finding ri+1 we can convert it to a value of p us-
ing Eq. (4). We note a slight subtlety in this system, in
that even for the case where the hierarchical network is
completely isolated at the lowest level we do not pre-
cisely recover percolation on a random network since we
are targeting only those nodes which began with at least
one link in the construction of the network. This leads
to a slight correction where we obtain ri+1 = 1/ki+1 (and
then convert this to a value for pc), rather than obtain-
ing the usual pc = 1/ki+1. In most cases this correction
will be quite small as for any reasonable value of k at
the lowest level, there will be very few nodes that do not
have a single link. For example, for the case of the net-
work referred to by the top line of the legend in Fig. 3b,
the transition for the 6th layer takes place at pc ≈ 0.201
as opposed to 1/k6 = 0.2.
INTERDEPENDENT NETWORKS
Much recent research has also explored the resilience
of interdependent networks where the nodes of one net-
work depend on nodes in another network [5, 38–45].
One example is that of a communication network that
is interdependent with a power grid, yet more complex
interdependencies are also possible [46, 47]. Many of
these interdependent networks will likely possess the hi-
erarchical structure described above. Therefore we now
extend our theory to the case of networks of interdepen-
dent networks (NON).
We will assume that each network is formed of the
same hierarchical structure, i.e. there are the same num-
ber of modules at each level. Again, this is intuitive since
the number of cities, neighborhoods, etc. that exist for
the power grid are likely the same as those for a commu-
nications network. Further, we will assume that nodes
are dependent on other nodes within their same module
at the lowest level. This corresponds to the assumption
that nodes are most likely dependent for resources from
nodes in their same neighborhood, i.e. a power station
depends on a communication tower in the same neigh-
borhood.
In the case of interdependent networks formed of n
networks with n > 2, the structure of the dependencies
can take various shapes. Among these are both treelike
structures, where networks depend on one another such
that their dependencies form a tree, or looplike struc-
tures where the dependencies form loops. Here we will
consider (i) treelike structures and (ii) a random-regular
(RR) network of networks where each network depends
on exactly w other networks.
Treelike Network Formed of Hierarchical Networks
Here we introduce the theory for a network of net-
works formed of n interdependent networks such that
they form a tree. For the interdependent case, Eqs. (4)-
(5) remain valid as for the single-network case.
For the treelike NON we assume that all nodes be-
tween pairs of interdependent networks have a depen-
dent node. Further, we assume the no-feedback condi-
tion, meaning that if node a in network n1 depends on
node b in network n2, then node b also depends on node
a. Lastly, we will attack the nodes of only one of the net-
works and let the attack propagate to the other networks.
To include the effects of the interdependencies, we
note that we must add an additional likelihood of failure
based on the interdependence. For a treelike network of
n interdependent networks with the dependencies within
the neighborhoods, this term is
(
1 − e−
(∑l
i= j ki
)
m jP∞
)n
[20,
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FIG. 3. (a) The RHS and LHS of Eq. (8) for the network of
Fig. 2a. We observe that for the first l = 5 layers the value
of p for which all interconnected nodes are removed (LHS of
Eq. (8)) is greater than the value at which the network con-
nectivity as a whole breaks down (RHS of Eq. (8)). However
for the 6th layer this is no longer true and we observe the con-
tinuous percolation transition of a random network. (b) The
values of the ith critical points for both the network described
in Fig. 2a and another network which has a smaller degree at its
bottom level. We note how changing the degree at the bottom
level effects the number of jumps since for the network with
a lowest level average degree of 2, before removing all inter-
connected nodes at the 5th layer, the network already breaks
apart.
43]. We then multiply this term with the other terms of
Eq. (7) to obtain
m jP∞ = pco j−1
[
e−k j (1 − r j)
(
1 − e−
(∑l
i= j+1 ki
)
m jP∞
)
+ r j
(
1 − e−
(∑l
i= j ki
)
m jP∞
) ] (
1 − e−
(∑l
i= j ki
)
m jP∞
)n−1
,
pco j−1 > p > pco j . (10)
We note that numerical simulations show excellent
agreement with the theory (Fig. 4). We also note that
in the case of interdependent networks, the final tran-
sition is now discontinuous due to the interdependence
[5, 38, 43].
FIG. 4. (a). The case of two interdependent networks with the
values of degree at each layer as given in the legend. Points
are simulations averaged over 10 realizations of networks with
N = 106 nodes and lines are theory. (b). Varying the number
of networks with the degree vector fixed to ~k = (0.05, 0.1, 6).
Random Regular Network Formed of Hierarchical
Networks
Lastly, we consider the case of an RR NON where
each network depends on exactly w other networks. We
will assume that for each pair of interdependent networks
only a fraction q of the nodes are interdependent and we
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will allow feedback (in contrast to what was done for
treelike NON). However, we will still restrict the depen-
dencies such that they must be within the same commu-
nity at the lowest level of the hierarchy.
In this case, the effects of the dependencies result in a
reduction of the size of the giant component by a factor of(
1 − q + qm jP∞
)w
[43, 48]. Combining this with Eq. (7)
yields,
P∞ = pcuto f f j−1
[
1
m j
e−k j (1 − r j)
(
1 − e−
(∑n
i= j+1 ki
)
m jP∞
)
+ r j
(
1 − e−
(∑l
i= j ki
)
m jP∞
) ] (
1 − q + qm jP∞
)w
,
pcuto f f j−1 > p > pcuto f f j . (11)
For the RR NON the final transition will be continu-
ous (depending on the value of q) as for an RR NON
formed of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks [48]. We observe ex-
cellent agreement between the theory of Eq. (11) and
simulations in Fig. 5 including the prediction regarding
the nature of the transitions.
DISCUSSION
In this work, we have studied the robustness of net-
works and networks of interdependent networks with a
hierarchical structure. This structure is very common
for many infrastructure networks, biological networks
and others. We have found analytical solutions and con-
firmed these solutions through simulations for isolated
hierarchical networks and two different structures of in-
terdependent hierarchical networks. The resilience of the
network depends on the number of communities at each
level of the hierarchy, the degree at each level of the hi-
erarchy, the fraction of nodes removed, and also the pa-
rameters governing the interdependence (if present).
Our results show that hierarchical networks can un-
dergo multiple abrupt transitions depending on the above
parameters and that these transitions represent the sep-
aration of the network at different levels of the hierar-
chy. These results have potential applications in optimiz-
ing the resilience of networks in infrastructure and other
fields.
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FIG. 5. A random regular network of networks where each net-
work depends on w other networks such that they form loops.
We vary both (a) q the level of interdependence between the
networks (with w = 1) and (b) w the number of networks each
network depends on (with q = 0.3). Symbols are simulations
averaged over 10 realizations on networks with N = 106 nodes
and lines are theory from Eq. (11)
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